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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists are beginning to realize that they 
have built a rather elaborate edifice on rather 
insubstantial; narrow foundations. 
Robert J. Heilbroner (1974) 
The I960's seemed to be the decade in which economics came 
of age as a science. That period saw a long interval of sus­
tained, uninterrupted growth, widely attributed to the "New 
Economics" in which government took an active role in influ­
encing the course of the economy. This success seemed to 
result from the fact that economists had injected a certain 
amount of exactness into their discipline. Forecasting models 
could be built which would simulate the economy and predict 
price movements, growth rates, and unemployment levels. Given 
these predictions, the accepted theory seemed capable of 
prescribing the correct remedies. 
But the above scenario does not have a happy ending. By 
the start of the 1970's, things had started to fall apart. The 
forecasting models increasingly errored in calling economic 
turns, and the policies that accepted theory said would work 
seemed to have lost some of their effectiveness. By the mid-
1970' s high unemployment and a substantial rate of inflation, 
phenomena which were at one time deemed mutually exclusive, 
were hopelessly intertwined. Increasingly, the accepted theory 
came to be questioned. 
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The emphasis in economics in the I960's (if not in the 
entire post-World War II period) had been on macroeconomics— 
economics of the large. The relevant variables here were the 
level of employment. Gross National Product, and the price 
level. But these aggregate variables were derived by summing 
over individual units, so the aggregate theory was no better 
than the theory explaining these individual economic units. 
For example, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow has stated that "The 
weakness of inflation theory goes right down to the micro level, 
to the theory of price determination at the level of the 
individual firm" (38, p. 59). Thus one has seen a renewed 
interest in microeconomics. 
Microeconomics—economics of the small—stresses "the 
study of the particular rather than the general . . (1, 
p. 86). Of interest here is the behavior of individual 
business firms, consuming units, and markets. Increasingly, 
economists have come to realize that a viable microeconomic 
theory is a prerequisite to understanding and explaining macro-
economic phenomena. 
What is the state of microeconomic theory? Unfortunately, 
changes in micro-theory have not kept pace with changes in the 
structure of the economic system. Adam Smith's invisible hand 
(circa 1776), the Marshallian scissors of supply and demand 
(circa 1890), and the marginal analysis of the 1930's seemed 
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incapable of explaining twentieth-century situations.^  One 
writer, for example, noted that value theory (microeconomics) 
failed "to give a realistic account of price formation in 
modem industrialized economies" (17, p. 3) . It has been noted 
that the Depression of the 1930's led to "drastic modifications 
in the orthodox theory of prices" (3-!-, p. 73). The feeling now 
exists that perhaps once again micro-theory needs some of those 
"drastic modifications." 
The business firm is at the center of microeconomics. It 
buys inputs in the factor markets or extracts them from their 
natural state, transforms these inputs into products and 
services, and sells these to final consumers or other firms. 
The standard assumption is that the goal of the firm is to 
maximize profits. In the growing economy of the I960's it was 
at times true that companies "made money in spite of them­
selves" because of growing aggregate demand and relatively 
cheap resources. But a time of slow (or nonexistent) economic 
growth and high input costs requires firms to look carefully 
at the myriad of decisions they make. 
The popular literature of the mid-1970's cited numerous 
examples of firms re-evaluating their product lines (see for 
example, 39) and pricing policies (32). A relevant question 
M^icro-theorists are not to be completely derided. One 
observes important contributions in welfare economics and 
general equilibrium analysis to cite several areas. See (33) 
and (4) for some examples of this work. 
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is whether or not some model or criteria exists to explain 
observed behavior or to which a firm can appeal for helo in 
choosing policies which will enhance the position of the firm. 
The purpose of this work is a more comprehensive look at 
the decision variables that are relevant to a business firm. 
The typical modern firm is multiprocess and multiproduct. Most 
literature that exists on the theory of the firm is concerned 
with choice of technology and choice of output levels, along 
with changes in these choices in response to factor price 
changes. For the sake of relevance, a different approach is 
required. The firm should be viewed as an offer maker; the 
decision variables available to it being those which it can 
manipulate to vary its offer. The firm must make these deci­
sions, cognizant of the fact that interdependencies exist in 
production, in sales, and also between these two functions. 
There exists in the economics literature fragments of 
multiproduct firm theory. This literature is reviewed in 
Chapter II. Chapter III presents a generalized model of a 
firm that is representative of those in a modern industrialized 
society. Chapter IV discusses how the model can be used by a 
firm to increase profitability and also limitations of the 
model. 
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CHAPTER II. THE STATE OF THE ART 
The purpose of this chapter is to review various aspects 
of existing efforts that purport to be theories of the business 
firm and to point out some of their deficiencies. First of 
all, let the following be taken as the definition of the 
business firm (22, pp. 595-6); 
The firm is a production and sales organization 
controlled by a group or individual such that at 
least one factor of production is allocated over 
the whole organization by the control group or 
individual. 
In other words, there is at least one element of commonality 
to all parts of the firm. One such element that comes to mind 
. is the capital budgeting unit. 
The firm we are interested in faces a downward sloping 
demand curve for some or all of its products. Thus it is a 
monopoly firm in the broad sense that it is the sole producer 
of its own unique product.^  It is reasonably easy to motivate 
a downward sloping demand curve. One writer noted (26, p. 92): 
If there are any differences in the product or 
services offered which allow the seller to believe 
that some of his buyers are attached or loyal to 
him or prefer him for any reason to other sellers 
of the 'same' (read: similar) goods, the seller 
may have a choice of possible prices. 
(parentheses in original) 
T^he interested reader is referred to (35, p. 5) for 
further discussion of monopoly in this context. 
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That writer goes on to state that in order to get a tilted 
demand curve, "It suffices that some customers have preferences 
for certain products or certain sellers, and that these pref­
erences are of different intensities" (26, p. 95). 
Another writer noted that the assumption of a downward 
sloping demand curve could be justified because (35, p. 90): 
. . . not all the customers, who are attached in 
varying degrees to a particular firm by the 
advantages which it offers them, will immediately 
forsake it for a rival who offers similar goods 
at an infinitesimally smaller price. 
The development of the theory of the business firm dates 
back to Riccardo and Maithus. Their firm was an English wheat 
farm. Inputs were land, labor, and capital; the output was a 
single, homogeneous commodity. The production function, or 
the relationship between inputs and outputs, was viewed 
broadly and intermediate processes and products were ignored. 
This arrangement yielded such results as the Law of Diminishing 
Returns and the associated U-shaped cost curves (12, pp. 1-3). 
The above model evolved into a model of entrepreneurial 
behavior and was used to explain entrepreneur decisions. It 
is still commonly presented as a theory of a business firm in 
intermediate microeconomic theory texts.^  For a modern in­
dustrialized economy, however, such a model might not ask a 
lot of important questions. The typical modern firm is 
S^ee for example (18), or (40). 
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multiprocess and multiproduct. Even if the simpler analysis 
applies to each process, it can't be used for the firm as a 
whole. Apparently these processes are related and it is 
advantageous to the firm to engage in all of them, rather than 
to have separate firms at each stage of the production cycle. 
Also, to assume that a firm sells only one product is a fiction. 
With many products, the sales of any one product potentially 
affects the sales of all other products. Thus the multi-
product, multiprocess firm can not be analyzed by looking at 
each product or process separately, but must be analyzed 
in toto. 
There are bits and pieces of such analysis existing in 
the economic literature. Unfortunately, all of these efforts 
fall short of being a complete theory of the firm. Many of 
them have concentrated on a firm which was a perfect competitor 
(see for example 20, or 21) . However, the interest here is a 
firm with a downward sloping demand curve, thus ruling out the 
perfect competitor. 
By introducing the possibility of a downward sloping 
demand curve, one makes several new decision variables 
available to the firm. The firm facing such a demand curve 
has some control over the price it charges—it is not a price 
taker. Since the interest here is the decision variables 
available to the firm, and also since relevance is a desirable 
goal, we will consider price as one decision variable available 
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to the firm. Therefore, the firm can affect its volume of 
sales by changing the prices it charges. But if the firm can 
alter sales by changing price, it has two more devices at its 
disposal to influence sales: the product itself and promotion 
of its products. Because of this, one must look not only at 
the production side of the firm but also the selling side. 
The bits and pieces of multiproduct firm literature fall 
into a rough dichotomy—part analyze the selling effort put 
forth by the firm and part analyze the production side of the 
firm. With respect to the selling side, cognizance of the 
phenomena of firms altering their product and promoting it is 
a relatively recent event in economics, dating from the 1930's. 
Prior to that time, emphasis was centered on two market struc­
tures—perfect competition and monopoly (that term being used 
here in the more traditional sense of the firm being the sole 
supplier of a product with no close substitutes). Selling 
effort was not considered important in either of these. The 
perfect competitor sold a homogeneous product so that the prod­
uct variation route was not available to him. Also he had no 
incentive to advertise or otherwise promote the product because 
the output of all firms was identical and the individual firm 
could sell all it wished to sell at the market price. The 
monopolist had no incentive to improve his product or advertise 
it because he had no competitors. 
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Chamberlin (8) was perhaps the earliest writer to formalize 
the treatment of nonprice variables available to the firm. He 
showed profit maximizing adjustment of advertising expenditures, 
product improvement, and price. His analysis was for a single 
product firm, however, and his handling of the production side 
of the firm followed the simplistic approach of the Riccardo-
Malthus model. Chamberlin's approach also implicitly assumes 
imperfect information. Sales promotion and advertising are 
only profitable if the buyer is not perfectly informed. The 
fact that the seller is imperfectly informed is reflected by 
the introduction of the big D and little d demand curves—the 
objective and the subjective demand curves, respectively.^  
Machlup (26) and Dorfman and Steiner (14) also addressed them­
selves to the problem of the optimal level of advertising and 
product adjustment, but again restricted their research to that 
of a single product firm. 
Selling efforts involving firms with more than one product 
have been investigated by several authors. Clemens (9) noted 
that "what the firm has to sell is not a product, or even a 
line of products, but rather its capacity to produce" (9, p. 2). 
The firm is viewed as facing different markets, each market 
associated with a different product. The firm should expand 
S^ee (8, pp. 90-94) for a complete discussion. 
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its product line into new markets as long as price exceeds 
marginal cost. He cast his analysis in a form similar to the 
Robinsonian price discrimination case.^  One problem with this 
is that the same marginal cost curve was used for all the 
products the firm produces. It is doubtful that all of the 
products of a firm have similar cost structures. 
Coase (10) and Bailey (5) also inquired into the pricing 
policy of a firm selling several products. Coase noted that 
if a firm sells several products, then either the costs of 
production are interrelated, the demands are interrelated, or 
both costs and demands are interrelated. Using a two product 
firm, he worked through the effects of several shocks to the 
firm (in the form of a tax and an autonomous shift in demand) 
when these interrelationships occur. The Bailey analysis 
parallels the Coase approach to a great extent. 
One problem with most of the foregoing works is that even 
though they give lip service to price, product, and promotion 
being the decision variables, much of the work is still carried 
out in terms of quantity adjustments. This reflects the 
lingering influence of the earlier emphasis on perfect competi­
tion. Since the perfect competitor was a price taker, his only 
adjustment variable was quantity. 
S^ee (35, pp. 179-202). 
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The most sophisticated treatments of the selling side of 
the firm are those by Scitovsky (37) for the single product 
firm and Holdren (23) for the multiproduct firm. Taking 
explicit account of the fact that the firm tries to manipulate 
the position of the demand curve it faces, Holdren introduces 
the term "sales function" (22, p. 100). This function has 
quantity as the dependent variable and price and nonprice 
dimensions of the offer as the independent variables. A multi-
product firm selling n products then has n sales functions of 
the following type: 
92 = P2' •••' ' ^1' ^ 2' f 
2^ ~ ^2' Pn' ^ 1' ^ 2' 
(2.1) 
9n ^  Sn(Pi' P2' •••' ^ n' ^ 1" ^ 2' ' ^m^  
where each a^  is some distinct nonprice way of varying the 
seller's offer for the associated product, i.e., "any activity 
of the seller which is perceptibly distinct to the buyer is 
potentially a distinct a^ " (22, p. 101). These sales functions 
take specific account of interdependencies among products on 
the demand side by including the prices of all products sold 
in any one sales function. 
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Associated with the production and selling activities is 
the cost function of the firm: 
C = Cf 92' •••/ 9^' ^ 2' ^ 2' •••' ^ m^ (2.2) 
Profit, or the excess of revenue over cost, is equal to 
n 
11= Z p.q. - C (2.3a) 
i=l  ^^  
or equivalently, 
H = p^ g^  2^^ 2 n^'^ n ~ 2^' ' ^2' 
(2.3b) 
Recognizing the fact that price and other offer variation 
items are the relevant decision variables, the first order 
conditions for profit maximization require that all first 
order partial derivatives be set equal to zero: 
= 0 i = 1,2,.../n (2.4) 
3Pi 
1^ =0 j = 1,2,...,m (2.5) 
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Carrying out these operations, one obtains 
an 
9Pi 
n f 
= q, + E 
i=l 
3q. 
9p. 
= 0 
9: 
3p, 
n 
= g? + 2 
 ^ i=l p i - %  9p, 
= 0 ( 2 . 6 )  
n  ^ 1=1 "i 39i 
3qi 
9p 
= 0 
n 
corresponding to 2.4 and also 
5® = ? ^  
1 i=l 9a Pi - % 
3c 
9a2 9aJ 
= 0 
. I f 
i=l 9 a, Pi - Hr 
3C 
9a2 Sag 
= 0 (2.7) 
an 
9 a 
n 
= E 
i=l 
3C 
Pi 3g. 
9q^  
9a_ 
3C 
9a_ 
= 0 
m 1 1 ~ '"m "~iti 
corresponding to Equation 2.5. 
To make economic sense out of these equations, it is 
necessary to go back and look at the single product case worked 
through by Scitovsky (37, pp. 247-264). Such a firm has only 
one sales function: 
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1 
q = q(pf a^; a^; a^) (2.8) 
with the associated cost function 
C = C(q, a^ , ..w a^ ) (2.9) 
Profit, n, is again equal to the difference between total 
revenue, p*q, and total cost 
n = p*q - C(q, a^, a^, ..., a^) (2.10) 
First order conditions for profit maximization require 
that the first order partial derivatives of ÎI with respect to 
all of its arguments are set equal to zero. 
1 1 ^ 1 X 
1 — 1,2,...,n 
Rearrangement of Equations 2.lia and 2.12a yields the 
following expressions 
The nonprice offer variables in the Scitovsky work are 
numbered from one to n. That notation is followed here. This 
is not to be confused with the n products of the Holdren firm. 
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p - If = -9/^ (2.11b) 
(2.12b) 
i = 1,2 ,. .. 7 n 
The left-hand side of these equations is the difference 
between price and marginal cost, where marginal cost here is 
the change in cost associated with a change in output brought 
about by a price change or an autonomous and exogenous shift 
in the demand for the product. Scitovsky calls this difference 
the profit margin. The right-hand side of these equations 
represents what Scitovsky calls "variation cost." He defines 
it as "The cost of improving the seller's offer sufficiently 
to raise his sales by one unit ..." (37, p. 248). Each 
aspect of the seller's offer has an associated variation cost. 
Equation 2.11b represents the price variation cost and the 
Equations in 2.12b represent nonprice variation cost. 
These equations express the profit maximizing conditions 
for a single product firm. The firm should adjust various 
aspects of its offer until the amount which a unit of the 
product adds to profit, i.e., the profit margin, is equal to 
the cost of selling that additional unit, i.e., the offer 
variation cost. 
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Returning to the initial Holdren equations, 2.6 and 2.7, 
upon putting them into the Scitovsky framework one obtains (by 
taking the n^  ^good as representative): 
3^q 
= -g n 
n-1 f 
Z 
i=l 
3C 
Pi ~ 3q. 
3qi 
3P n 
n 
n/ 3p, 8q (2.13) 
n 
3p. 
n 
The left-hand side of 2.13 is the profit margin of the n^  ^
commodity and the right-hand side can be interpreted as the 
price offer variation cost in the multiproduct case. There 
would be n equations like 2.13. 
With respect to nonprice offer variation cost. Equation 
2.7 becomes (again using the n^  ^product and the aspect of 
the offer): 
n 
9C 
9q. 
3C n-1 E 
i=l 
3C 
8q, 
9q^ . 
3a m—I 
n 
3q (2.14) 
n 
3 a. 
m 
The left-hand side of 2.14 is again to be interpreted as the 
profit margin of the n^  ^product and the right-hand side as 
the offer variation cost of the m^  ^nonprice offer variation. 
There would be m*n such equations: n products and m offer 
variations for each product. 
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A quick perusal of Equations 2.13 and 2.14 shows some of 
the complications that arise when we consider the multiproduct 
firm. If the i^  ^product in 2.13 is complementary with the 
th Sq. 3q f 
n product, -z— is negative, as is -g—. p^  -
n^ n^ 
9C 
9q^  is 
assumed positive so that the whole second term on the right-
hand side is negative. This has the effect of reducing the 
optimal profit margin on the n^  ^product. Alternatively, if 
products i and n are substitutes, that second term is positive 
and the optimum profit margin on the n^  ^commodity is made 
larger. 
Similar interdependencies are apparent when one looks at 
Equation 2.14. For example, if a nonprice offer variation 
affects the sale of other products in a positive fashion,^  
this leads to more of its use because several commodities are 
Such as promotion campaigns for a class of food products 
or promotion of a name such as "At General Electric, progress 
is our most important product." 
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underwriting its cost.^  Neither the Scitovsky nor the Holdren 
models represent a completely developed theory of the multi-
product firm. Both writers develop their models from a 
generalized cost function, without working out joint production 
relationships and intermediate processes. Also, both writers 
concentrate on just the selling aspects cf the firm. 
There have also been theoretical developments looking 
exclusively at the production and cost side of the multiproduct 
firm. The fact that the firm produces several products causes 
some complications above and beyond those encountered in the 
analysis of the single product firm. Fixed factors of produc­
tion, those which can not be changed in amount in the short 
run, must be explicitly handled. With several products, the 
possibility exists of transferring these factors among the 
products, a possibility which doesn't exist in the single 
product firm. Since each product may be competing for the use 
L r 
It is assumed E 
i=l 
9C 
Pi 9g. 
I 
is positive, other­
wise a would not be used. In the equation 
m 
n 
3C 
9a 
m 
9C 
3a_ 
m 
is the cost of using additional amounts of the m^ h nonprice 
offer variation. It is also assumed that this marginal cost is 
positive and nondecreasing. Thus it can be made larger (more 
of the mth dimension of the offer used) to offset the positive 
second term so that the right-hand side still equals the profit 
margin. 
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these limited fixed factors, the multiproduct firm can not be 
viewed as a collection of single product firms. 
Central to the analysis of the single product firm is the 
production function—a relation between output and inputs which 
expresses the maximum product obtainable from those inputs, 
given a fixed plant and the existing state of technology.^  
Thus by writing a production function, we assume that we have 
solved the technical maximization problem—we combine inputs 
in such a fashion that we obtain the most output. This is 
acceptable for a single product firm, but for a multiproduct 
firm what to produce and how much to produce are no longer 
technical questions but economic ones dealing with the alloca­
tion of the firm's resources. 
Most studies of the cost and production problems of the 
multiproduct firm have taken a programming approach, and in 
particular a nonlinear programming route. Pfouts (30) was 
perhaps the first to use this approach, introducing constraints 
to the effect that the production of the several products could 
not exceed the capacity of some fixed factors and also 
including a cost of shifting fixed factors from one product to 
another. 
Letting x^ , x^ , ..., x^  denote the n different products, 
i^j amount of the variable factor used in producing 
F^or a complete discussion of the production function, 
see (7, pp. 14-15). 
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the product and its associated price, and the amount 
of the t^  ^fixed factor used in producing the i^  ^product, 
Pfouts' formal problem was as follows : 
Minimize 
subject to 
Z Z w.y. . + K(z--, ..., z ) + F (2.15) j J  ^J -L-L np 
x^  •••f i^iti' i^l' ' ' ' r i^p ^ ~ ^  (2,16) 
and 
n 
Z 
i=l 
1 — 1,2,» # #,n 
< 0 (2.17) 
r — l,2,...,p 
In 2.15, K(z^ t, ..., z^ p) reflects the cost of switching fixed 
9K factors, of which there are p. ^  is assumed positive and 
dZij 
represents the cost of switching a small amount of fixed factor 
j to the production of product i. F in this equation represents 
fixed costs. The problem is to minimize costs, 2.15, subject 
to a given level of output, 2.16, and also subject to the con­
straint 2.17 that the firm doesn't use mors of a fixed factor 
than is available, Z^ . Pfouts then appeals to the Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem to show the conditions which must hold for a cost 
minimum. 
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Naylor (28) expands the Pfouts model, handling the problem 
as one of profit maximization instead of cost minimization and 
allowing a variety of market structures, whereas Pfouts 
restricts his analysis to perfect competition in the factor 
markets. Hence Naylor*s problem is to maximize profit, the 
excess of revenue over costs, where costs again include a cost 
of switching fixed factors, subject to technical constraints 
in the form of a production function and the availability of 
fixed factors. Again the author appeals to the Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
profit maximization. 
None of the approaches presented in this chapter represent 
a complete or fully relevant theory of the firm. What follows 
is an attempt to present a model of the business firm which 
will more closely approach those which operate in a modem 
industrial economy. 
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CHAPTER III. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYZING A MULTIPRODUCT FIRM 
Preliminary Comments 
It was earlier stated that one goal of this work is to 
take explicit account of decision variables that are relevant 
to a business firm. Before a formal model is introduced, some 
preliminary comments are in order. 
Traditional (Neo-classical) analysis views the firm as a 
mechanism that connects factor markets and the markets for 
final products. The emphasis is on the flows of inputs and 
outputs because these quantities reflect the impact of the 
firm upon the markets in which it participates and also how the 
firm affects resource allocation. One writer summed up this 
approach by stating (24, p. 178): 
The economizing problem facing the firm ... is 
that of deciding how much to produce and how much 
of various inputs to use in producing this 
output .... 
Fixed factors of production are given only an embryonic treat­
ment in this traditional approach. Their return is often 
viewed as a residual; and if the firm is postulated as being 
a single product firm, no question of allocating fixed factors 
is raised. 
S^ee (18r p. 375) for a discussion of this point. 
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For completeness and realism, it is necessary to go to a 
mathematical programming approach. Such an approach is inward 
looking, expressly concerned with resource allocation within 
the firm. The rates of flows are still important in a pro­
gramming framework (in the form of activity levels) but in 
addition the quantities of fixed factors are central to the 
problem because they become data determining what the firm can 
and cannot do (13, pp. 201-2). The programming approach can 
also take full cognizance of interdependencies in both produc­
tion and sales which are difficult, if not impossible, to 
predict in classical production theory. 
Attention here is centered on the firm in a particular 
short run. This emphasis should not lead to myopia with 
respect to the relevance of the model. It must be realized 
that the firm is moving along a time path, and that ideally 
the firm would try to maximize profits over some span of time. 
î'That the firm is like during any given time period depends on 
previous decisions. What it inherits in terms of capital 
stock, work force, product mix, reputation, and other charac­
teristics are all results of past behavior. Given an awareness 
of this, current decisions must be made in the context of what 
has happened previously, appreciating the fact that current 
decisions affect not only current profits but future profit­
ability as well. 
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The short run—long run distinction is usually based upon 
the fixity of factors.^  The short run is characterized by the 
fact that there is at least one fixed input: its availability 
is unalterable in the time period under discussion. Thus in 
the short run the firm is limited in its capabilities by the 
properties of any fixed factors. An alternative basis (Alchian) 
for the short run—long run distinction lies in the amount of 
time that is allowed to elapse between when the production 
decision is made and when the first output is available. This 
approach has the advantage that costs of adjusting factors are 
built into the production decision. 
The expression "costs of production" will be taken to 
mean (2, p. 23) : 
The change in (the decision maker's) equity 
caused by the performance of some specified 
operation, where, . . . the attendant change 
in income is not included in the computation 
of the change in equity. 
The realization of profits during a period would thus mean an 
increase in equity. Alternatively, a loss during a period 
would mean a decline in the present value of the firm's assets. 
The distinction between factors (fixed or variable) is 
usually extended to costs. Fixed costs are those costs that 
are independent of the level of output. These costs define 
T^he short run—long run dichotomy is a convenient and 
fruitful artifice. For an insightful discussion of this, see 
(15) . 
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the scale of plant and do not vary in thië short run. A 
variable cost figure results from summing over the amounts 
spent on variable factors of production. It is therefore 
dependent on the level of output. 
Most discussions of cost stop with the above bifurcation, 
but a third type of cost exists which can be identified. 
Holdren labeled this class of costs "discretionary fixed costs" 
and stated that they are those costs "which are fixed with 
respect to output variation, but are decision variables within 
the functional time period known as the short run" (23, p. 33). 
These costs are akin to fixed costs because they do not vary 
with the level of output, but they can be set at different 
levels in the short run. An example cited by Holdren (whose 
analysis centered on a retail store) was the level of main­
tenance, which is a function of the entrepreneur's whim and 
not strictly dependent on the level of output. 
It has been mentioned that what is frequently presented 
as being the theory of production and cost for a firm is 
actually relating to only one process within the firm. To 
produce a given product typically requires numerous processes, 
and this number is compounded when the firm becomes multi-
product. 
Suppose that a firm produces n products and that it were 
possible to write production functions for each product. One 
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would then have the following expressions:^  
9^  ~ ^ l^ l^' ^ 2' •**' ^ r' ^ 2' ^ 3' •••' 9^ ) 
92 ~ ^ 2 ^ 1^, ^ 2' '**' ^ r' *^ 1' ^ 3' •••' 9%^  
(3.1) 
9n - ^ n^ l^' ^ 2' ' ^r' ^ 1' ^ 2' '"' ^n-1^  
where Y-^ t 2^* •••' are inputs. With a multiproduct firm, 
the production of any one product may be completely independent 
of the production of other products or it may be affected in a 
positive or negative fashion. Hence 
—- I 0 (3.2) 
3qj 
1 1 y 2 / % m • f n 
j — 1/ •••/ n 
i ^  j 
Given these production functions, it is possible to obtain 
a cost function: 
C — 2^' •••' 9^ ) (3*3) 
T^his discussion of the behavior of cost and production 
functions follows (23, pp. 234-251) closely. 
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where the q's are implicitly functions of the y's. 
Several expressions derived from this cost function are of 
interest. The marginal cost of the i^  ^product, MC^ , is given 
by 
MC. = (3.4) 
i = 1, 2, ... , n 
It is well to remember that marginal cost in this context is 
the change in cost associated with a change in output brought 
about by a price change or an autonomous and exogenous shift 
in the demand for the product. 
Another expression of interest is the change in the 
marginal cost of the i^  ^commodity as the production rate of 
the commodity is varied: 
3qj 3gj3qi (3.5) 
i — 1,2, ..., n 
j = 1, 2, .../ n 
i r j 
3MC. 
If „ ^ =0, then we can say that these two commodities are 
dq j 
3MC. 
unrelated in production. If > 0, they are competing with dq j 
3MC. 
one another in production, and if —— < 0 we say that they are 
dq j 
complementary. 
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Continuing in this vein a little further, more realism 
can be injected. Almost every firm or plant utilizes inter­
mediate processes whose outputs are not sold. They are 
consumed by the enterprise and are necessary for the final 
output. Let the following notation be introduced: 
g. = the amount of the i^  ^product sold by the firm 
X — 1/ 2/ .../ n 
Q = the vector of sold outputs 
~ ^2' 9^ 1^  
X, = an intermediate product 
k = 1, 2, s 
X = the vector of intermediate products 
= f 2^' •••/ ) 
Y = the vector of inputs 
= (y^ / 72' 
a^  = a nonprice offer variation 
"J — 1/ 2/ ... y m 
A = the vector of nonprice offer variations 
The production functions for the various sold outputs 
might then be written as follows: 
q-L = q2' Qg/  ^ q^ ; X; A) 
^ 2  ^  3 2 ^ 1 '  9 3 /  • • • /  q ^ ;  X ;  A )  
(3. 
q^  = q^ (Y; q2; •••/ q^ -i' 
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These equations state that each q is a function of the Y-vector 
of inputs, the levels of output of other products, the X-vector 
of intermediate outputs, and the A-vector of nonprice offer 
variations. 
In addition to these equations, a set such as the follow­
ing would exist: 
— Xj^ CY/ Q/ X2, Xg, •••, Xg ^ A) 
Xg = XgfY; Q; x^, x^, x^; A) 
(3.7) 
x g  —  X g ( Y ;  Q j  x ^ /  X 2 /  • • • f  X g _ 2 7  A )  
These state that each x is a function of Y, Q, A, and all 
other intermediate products besides itself. 
Finally, the following set of equations would appear: 
a^ a^CYf Qy X; 3.^, ^2' •••' / 
3-2^  — 3-^  (Y; Q; X; a^ , a^ , • « • , a^ )^ 
(3.8) 
0: 2^ 
These state that each individual a^  is the aj-function of the 
vector of inputs, the vector of final outputs, the vector of 
intermediate products, and all other nonprice offer variations, 
Given the relationships that exist in 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, 
the total cost function of the firm becomes 
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C = C(0,  X, A) (3.9) 
Hence total cost depends on the Q-vector of all sold outputs, 
the X-vector of intermediate products, and the A-vector of non-
price offer variations. 
In addition to the earlier marginal cost relationships, 
several more can be derived from Equation 3.9. For example, 
one could consider the effect of an intermediate process on the 
cost of a final product: 
3MCi ,2^  
(3.10a) 
Î — 1/ 2/ •••/ n 
k — 1/ 2/ •••/ s 
Depending on the sign of this expression, an intermediate 
process may be competitive with (if 3.10 > 0), independent of 
( = 0), or complementary with (< 0) the i^  ^final output. If 
an intermediate process is used, it must on balance be 
complementary, or it would not pay to use it. 
An expression similar to 3.10a can be derived to show more 
about the causality involved in a cost change. This expression 
would be 
k — If 2y •••/ s 
i — 1/ 2f m • m f n 
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This expression shows the change in cost attributable to a 
change in an intermediate process, where the change in the 
intermediate process is caused in turn by a change in some 
sold output. 
Another relationship that exists is the effect which a 
nonprice offer variation can have on the marginal cost of a 
final product: 
9MC. ^  
] ] 1 
i — If 2/ m », I n 
j If 2f e # »/ m 
Once again the possibility of competition (> 0), independence 
(= 0), or complementarity (< 0) exists. 
As final point before setting up a formal model, there 
is a different type of marginal cost concept: 
MCa, = If- (3.12) 
] ] 
] — 1/ 2/ •••/ m 
This represents the change in cost caused by a change in the 
level of the form of nonprice offer variation. This dif­
fers from the previous notion of marginal cost because earlier 
a change in quantity, q^ , was causing the cost change. 3.12 
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iS the marginal cost associated with changing the offer in 
the a^  direction. 
Theoretical Model of a Multiproduct Firm 
Central to this discussion of the business fiirm is the 
notion of a production process. Such a process is a technical 
relationship between inputs and output. What is usually 
referred to as the production function for a firm actually 
describes a process. Any firm is a collection of processes, 
and typically inputs go through many processes before a final 
product emerges. 
Consider the following definitions: 
X = output of a process 
The combining of variable inputs with the fixed 
factors of production yields the x's. 
These x's can be separated into several identifiable subsets. 
Xg = output of a process that is sold 
n = 1, 2, ..., N 
The firm sells N products. Each x^  represents a different type 
of finished product. 
x^  = output of a process that is a nonprice offer variation 
m= 1, 2, ..., M 
Some processes exist solely for the purpose of affecting demands 
for final products. The x^ 's are the outputs of those 
processes. These outputs aren't sold but do affect sales. 
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Xj = nonsold outputs other than intermediate products, 
w = 1, 2, W 
The outputs of some processes accrue to the entire firm and are 
not necessarily used up in time period t. The levels of output 
from these processes are not dependent on the profit maxi­
mizing levels of output of other processes. Examples include 
investment activities and research and development activities, 
x^  ^= output of the r^  process that is used as an input 
in the i^  ^process. These outputs are nonsold like 
the previous set, but they are allocable to time 
period t because the levels at which they appear are 
dictated by the levels of the x^ 's and x^ 's that q a 
occur in that time period. There are R such 
processes the produce these intermediate outputs. 
Hence r = 1, 2, R. 
These intermediate outputs can be used to produce 
more intermediate products (of which there are R); 
they can be used to produce the sold outputs (the 
N final products); they can be used to produce the 
nonprice offer variations variable in the short run 
(of which there are M); or they can be used to pro­
duce those outputs that are nonallocable to time 
t (of which there are W). Therefore, i can go from 
I t o R  +  N  +  M  +  W .  
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Xy = output of an intermediate process. 
This notation will be used when it is not of 
importance where this output is being used. 
Yg = a fixed factor of production 
s— 1/ 2/ .../ S 
These represent fixed factors in the traditional 
sense. They delineate the limits of the firm and 
the limits of any given process. 
y^  = a variable input 
k— 1/ 2j .../ K 
The utilization of these variable inputs depends on 
the output levels of the processes. 
Bringing some of the above definitions together, one 
obtains the X vector of outputs of processes : 
, 1 2  R  R + 1  R + N  , R + N + 1  „ R - f - N + M + W .  
or, element by element 
1 1 
X = Xy 
2 2 
X = Xy 
X® = Xy 
X--1 = x: 
R+N • N 
X = Xg 
35 
xR+N+1 = 
R+N+M M X = x^  
R+N+M+1 _ 1 
— I 
R+N+M+W W 
x = X]. 
Figure 3.1 is a schematic diagram of a firm, tracing the 
origins of the x's and their destinations. These x's, the out­
puts of the processes, result from combining variable inputs 
with the fixed factors. They fall into one of four categories: 
1) some are finished products and are sold; 2) some are non-
price offer variations which affect the level of sales; 3) some 
are used as inputs of other processes; 4) some remain in the 
firm and are available for later utilization. 
The Neoclassical assumption of profit maximization as the 
goal of the firm will be maintained here. In other words, the 
firm seeks to make the excess of revenues over costs as large 
as possible. This maximization takes place over sold outputs 
at time t. On the revenue side, the firm faces N sales 
functions, one for each sold output: 
The firm—limits defined 
by the fixed inputs—the 
Yg's. This is a collec­
tion of processes. 
.ML 
Outputs of processes 
' s 
The outputs of 
some processes 
are sold 
The outputs of 
some processes 
affect sales 
Figure 3,1. Diagram of multiprocess firm 
Variable inputs 
Outputs nonallocable 
to time t 
processes are used 
The outputs of some 
in other processes. 
ri 
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1 1 ,  1 2  
Xq - ' Pn' ^a' ^a^ 
2 2, 12 M, 
Xq - Xq(p^ , P2/ .../ P^ ; x^ , x^ , ..., x^ ) 
(3.13) 
N N, 12 M, Xq - Xq(p^ , . . . ,  p^ ; x^ , x^ , ..., x^ ) 
These equations state that the sales of any one commodity may 
be affected by its own price, the price of any other commodity, 
and any other aspects of the seller's offer. It is assumed 
that 
ax* 
< 0 (3.14) 
n^ 
n = 1, 2 ,  . . .  ,  N 
i.e., the firm faces a downward sloping demand curve for each 
of its products.^  Also, 
3x^  
3Pn: 
 ^0 (3.15) 
n — 1, 2, ..., N 
n* = 1, 2, ..., N 
n ^  n' 
3.15 states that any two products may be complements (if < 0 
holds), substitutes (> 0), or independent (= 0) in sales. 
This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity. It 
would be easy to introduce a set of constraints on some prices, 
thus reducing the number of independent variables. 
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Finally on the sales side 
(3.16) 
n = 1, 2, 
• • • / N 
III — 1J 2 / 
• • • / M 
states that any change in a nonprice offer variation may affect 
the sales of any one commodity in a positive manner, in an 
adverse manner, or not at all. 
Total revenue is given by the expression 
N 
T.R. = S p„ x" (3.17) 
n=l " 9 
which is simply a weighted sum of quantities sold, the weights 
of course being prices. 
Several different types of costs must be considered to 
arrive at a total cost figure. First of all, the firm incurs 
fixed costs. These will be split into traditional fixed costs, 
F^ , and discretionary fixed costs, Fg. As the firm produces 
outputs, it also incurs variable costs by purchasing variable 
inputs. Let the following expression be taken to represent the 
amount spent on variable inputs, i.e., variable costs 
T^his variable cost expression represents costs which 
result from the maximizing of profit over sold outputs. For 
completeness one could have a class of costs called discre­
tionary variable costs. This is only mentioned because it is 
conceivable that some could exist. 
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V.C. = V(y^ , Y2' f 7%) (3.18a) 
3 V The expression stands for the cost of an additional unit 
of the variable input—the marginal acquisition cost of the 
factor. If the firm purchases input k in a perfectly competi­
tive market, then 
9V 
= V, (3.18b) 
where v^  is the price of the variable input. 
A final type of cost is incurred because of the multi­
process and multiproduct nature of the firm. It becomes 
necessary to be concerned with how the fixed factors are 
utilized. The fixed factors can be switched from one use to 
another, a situation which is not present in single process or 
single product, discussions of the firm, and typically this 
switching is not costless as retooling and similar adjustments 
must be made. This gives rise to a final type of cost— 
switching costs: 
Switching Costs = SW(y^ ,^ y^ g, •••/ ^ i^ r+n+M+W ' ' 
S^,R+N+M+W^  (3.19) 
where 
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(3.20) 
s  —  1 /  2 f  . . . j  S  
i = 1, 2 ,  R+N+M+W 
In this expression represents the amount of fixed factor s 
in 3.20 represents the cost of this allocation. 
A total cost figure is obtained by combining 3.18, 3.19, 
and the fixed cost figures: 
Profit, IT, is the excess of revenue over cost and can be 
written as 
It is assumed that the firm's goal is to maximize 3.22. 
The firm doesn't have unlimited freedom in doing so, however. 
The limits of the firm are defined by the fixed factors. Thus 
any production is limited by the amount of fixed factors 
available. The utilization of any fixed factor is a function 
of variable inputs used with that factor. This utilization 
can not exceed the availability of the factor, y^ . This gives 
rise to a set of constraints such as the following: 
allocated to the process whose output is x^ . The derivative 
Total Cost = + Fg + v(y^ ) + SWCy^ )^ (3.21) 
(3.22) 
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l^^ l^l' ^ 12' "" ^1%) -^ 1 
2^^ 2^1' ^ 22' '""' ^ 2%) -^ 2 
(3.23) 
S^^ S^l' ^ S2' — ^ S 
/\ th 
where represents the amount of the k variable input 
processed through the fixed factor. The h^  function 
monitors how much has been claimed by the various processes 
as variable inputs are used by the firm. 
3.23 is written in a way that departs from the usual 
treatment of fixed factors. Taking the Pfouts * article (30) 
as representative, let represent the quantity of the t^  ^
fixed factor used in the production of the i^  product. 
represents the total quantity of fixed factor t available. A 
constraint on the firm with respect to its fixed factors would 
then be written 
Z :it 1 2t 
where i indexes the processes which use the t^  ^fixed factor. 
By writing the constraints on the availability of the 
fixed resources in the form embodied in 3.24, previous writers 
have made several assumptions of which they might not have 
been aware. First of all, summing assumes that the fixed 
factors are completely assignable to the outputs. Related to 
this is the fact that additivity assumes independence and 
42 
exclusion in the use of fixed factors—what one process uses 
is not available to be used in other processes. 
However, some of the fixed factors might be like public 
goods, and both of the above conditions would be violated in 
such cases. Public goods are goods which have the character­
istic that "... each individual's consumption of such a good 
leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption 
of that good ..." (36, p. 387). A common example is a 
lighthouse, where one ship's use of the beacon in no way 
diminishes the amount of light available for other ships. This 
same situation probably holds true for some fixed factors. 
They are equally available to all processes and the use of such 
a fixed factor by one process neither diminishes the amount 
available to other processes nor precludes its use by other 
processes. This is not to be construed to mean that these 
public good-type fixed factors don't impose constraints on the 
firm. They are only available in finite amounts. It is the 
assigning of these finite amounts that causes problems. 
Writing 3.23 in its present form allows for these situations. 
3.23 will represent the set of constraints imposed on the 
firm when it attempts to maximize profit. There is also a set 
of relationships which exist that relate the inputs of any 
given process to its output. These are analogous to production 
functions in the sense that their shapes are determined by the 
fixed factors and the state of technology, and also because we 
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will assume that we obtain the maximum yield from the inputs. 
These are of the following form: 
A /\ /\ 21 31 Rl 1 
l^^ l^' ^ 2' k^' ' ' Xy ) = Xy 
^2 (^ 1' ^ 2' ' ' ' ' ^k' ' ^y ' ' ' ' ' ^y ) ~ 
y 
SRiyi' y2 k^'- \ 
9r.1<JI' ?2 ?k' 
9lW.N<yi' ^ 2 ==y'^ ™ 
R^+N+1 
(y^ / Yg; ••• / y^ ; , R,R+N+1j ^  ^ i 
9R+N+M(yi' ^ 2 xR,R+N+M) = 
9R+N4.M+l(yi' ^ 2 
 ^ l,R+N+M-t-W R,R+N+M+W,_ W 
9R+N+M+W^ 1^' ^ 2' k^' *y ' *y  ^ I 
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These state that the output of any process depends on the 
variable inputs used and any intermediate outputs that are used 
by the process. The functional forms of 3.25 will be dictated 
by the state of technology and the stock of fixed factors. 
These expressions will not initially be built explicitly into 
the model of profit maximization. They are what might be 
called side relations in the sense that they state the paths 
via which the fixed factors are used. 
The Mathematics of Profit Maximization 
It was previously stated that a nonlinear programming 
approach would be most fruitful in determining profit max­
imizing conditions for a multiproduct firm. To an economist, 
the important question is what will be the characteristics of 
an optimal output scheme when it is found. These character­
istics are summarized in a group of conditions known 
collectively as the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. 
The Kuhn-Tucker Theorem is a mathematical tool for 
describing optimality conditions of functions constrained by 
equalities and inequalities, rather than just equalities as 
classical constrained optimization requires. The following 
represents a full generalization of the nonlinear programming 
approach to the maximizing process in the static sense. 
Consider the following problem: Find extreme values of a 
function 
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^ 2 *  " " ' f  ( 3 . 2 6 )  
where the variables are constrained by inequalities of the 
following fonri: 
^27 •••/ s^) ^  0 (3.27) 
j = 1/ 2/ » «.f J 
1^' ^ 2' z^ Present variables under control of the 
maximizing unit. For a maximization problem, it is necessary 
to assume that the objective function 3.26 and the constraints 
3.27 are concave and differentiable.^  
The first step in obtaining optimality conditions entails 
formulating the Lagrangian function: 
J 
L ( £ .  /  X . )  =  i p i e . )  +  Z  X . 0 .  ( e . )  (3 .28)  
^ J 1 j_2 J J 1 
for 
£ ^ ^ 0  i  =  1 ,  2 ,  . . . ,  n  
X j ^ O  i  =  1 ,  2 ,  . . . ,  J  
To insure the existence of a constrained maximum at 
o o 
and X^ , it is necessary and sufficient that a saddle point 
exists at the extreme value. To insure the existence of a 
O^ptimality conditions have been worked out under less 
restrictive assumptions concerning concavity. See, for 
example, (3). 
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saddle point, it is necessary and sufficient that the following 
conditions hold;^  
3L 
a^ i 
< 0 
Si=Si 
(3.29) 
1 — X/ 2/ / 11 
3L 
3ei 
i^ = 0 
£i=£i 
(3.30) 
i — 1/ 2/ ...y n 
E .  > 0  X — (3.31) 
i — 1/ 2/ .../ n 
3L 
ax. 
> 0 (3.32) 
Xj-X! 
j = 1, 2, 
9L 
3Xj X . = 0 
(3.33) 
j — 1, 2/ .« f J 
o 
X. > 0 (3.34) ] — 
j — 1/ 2/ .../ J 
T^hese conditions are expressed in several forms in the 
literature. The statement of them given here comes from (29, 
p. 151). 
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Turning to the problem at hand, the firm's problem is to 
maximize profit, where in the first instance this maximization 
is constrained by the availability of fixed factors. 
Formally, the firm's problem is to maximize 
N 
TT = 2^  Pn^ q " + ^ 2^  + V(y^ , yg, . y%) + SWCy^ )^] 
(3.35) 
subject to 
l^^ l^l' ^ 12' I^K^  -^ 1 
2^2' •••' ^ 2%) -^ 2 (3.36) 
S^^ S^l' ^ S2' ' 
The first step towards obtaining optimality conditions is 
to put expressions 3.35 and 3.36 into a Lagrangian framework 
like 3.38. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary 
to alter several of them in order to take account of certain 
economic phenomena. 
The cost of switching function, 3.19, gives rise to 
several problems. Recall that is assumed positive and 
^^ si 
that it represents the cost of allocating some of fixed factor 
s to the orocess whose outout is x\ This cost is an ex ante 
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cost incurred by the firm in the sense that prior to actual 
production, a decision must be made as to how the fixed factors 
will be used. In other words, before production even starts 
this switching cost is incurred as the fixed factors are 
allocated to each process in an amount that seems adequate for 
the anticipated output of that particular process. This means 
that switching costs are not directly dependent on the rate of 
output from a given process: 
The switching costs are characterized by what is 
frequently called "luirpiness" — they do not change smoothly 
but instead occur at intervals and in lump sums. If the 
initial estimate of the amount of a fixed factor required for 
a process is correct, no more switching costs are incurred by 
switching that particular factor to the process in question. 
If the initial allocation proves insufficient, once again a 
switching cost must be incurred as more of the fixed factor is 
diverted to that process (assuming, of course, that some is 
still available). 
In order to handle these problems that arise with 
switching costs, the SWCy^ )^ function will be subsumed into the 
discretionary fixed cost group, Fg. Strictly speaking, they 
(3.37) 
i = 1, 2 
• • • / R+N+M+W 
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aren't discretionary fixed costs because their level will 
depend to some degree on output variation. However, putting 
them into does not damage to the model and essentially 
simplifies the bookkeeping. 
The way in which V(y^ , y2/ •-./ y^ ) changes in response 
to output changes requires some amplification. Changes in this 
function occur because the firm employs different amounts of 
the variable inputs: 
dV = ay, + ... + dy„ (3.38) 
ayj 3yj. 
However, these changes in variable input use are caused 
by changes in the quantities of sold outputs and changes in the 
levels of nonprice offer variations. The total change in cost 
associated with changing the level of production of the n^  ^
sold output is equal to: 
3V _ av 3?! av 3^ 2 av  ^. 
—n ; n iï E (3.39) 
3%% a?! 3%; ayz 3%; 3yK ax* 
Because of the interdependencies that exist with respect 
to sales, all prices affect the sales of any given sold output. 
3x^  
If the price of the i sold output changes, a term exists 
which need not equal zero. This adds another dimension to how 
costs change. Taking the n^  ^and i^  ^goods as representative. 
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we obtain the following result: 
(3.40) 3x= =Pi ••• 
3.40 holds true for ail n goods sold. Since we are 
interested in the change in variable costs caused by a change 
3V in price, it is necessary to sum expressions similar to 
3.40 over all N goods. This gives rise to 
% • X i 11 Sf K q 
Finally, from an interpretative standpoint the 
V(y^ , y^ , ..., y^ ) function is to be considered net of costs 
incurred producing the x^ 's. We are maximizing profit over 
sold output. Thus we want only those costs that result from 
those sold outputs, nonprice offer variations, or true inter­
mediate products. 
Care must also be taken in interpreting the constraints 
relating to the availability of the fixed factors, 3.36. The 
lumpiness discussed earlier relates to the allocation of fixed 
factors, not their utilization once allocated. The costs 
associated with switching fixed factors don't directly depend 
on the outputs of the processes. However, utilization of 
fixed factors does depend on outputs, and hence on the flows 
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of,variable inputs. Because of this, 
> 0 (3.42) 
s = 1/ 2/ .../ S 
k = If 2, . .. , K 
if variable factor k passes through the s^  ^fixed factor. 
Also, the amount of a fixed factor available, is to be 
considered net of the amounts used in producing the x^ 's. This 
is so because of the maximization of profit is over sold out­
puts at time t. We are interested in the first instance in 
determining optimal levels of the x^ 's, x^ 's, and x^ 's. How 
the firm determines the x^ 's is a different type of problem 
which will be discussed later. 
Given the previous remarks, it is now possible to proceed 
to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for profit maximization. The 
relevant decision variables for the firm are those which affect 
its offer. It will be this set of variables which the firm 
will adjust in order to maximize profit. In the case at hand, 
these are the prices of all sold outputs and the levels of the 
variable nonprice offer variations. 
Rewriting the problem after incorporating the change in 
the cost function, one obtains: 
N  ^
 ^= ^ 2^  Pn^ q • [(^ 1 + Fg) + VCy^  y^ , 7%.)] (3.43) 
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subject to 
^12'  "" 
^^ (^ 21' ^ 22' ' ' ^2%) -^ 2 
(3.44) 
^S2' '"' — ^ S 
Pn 1 0 (3.45) 
n = 1, 2 ,  ..., N 
> 0 (3.46) 
i = 1, 2 ,  ..., R+N+M+W 
Upon setting up the Lagrangian function corresponding to 
3.28, the following equation results: 
N 
L(Pn' s^^  Pn^ q ~ "^ l^ ^  ^2^  ^^ 1^' ^ 2' ' '  ^
n—X 
+ Ï - hsCYsi' 7^ 2 ysk>' (3-471 
S=1 
The derivation of conditions corresponding to 3.29 to 
3.34 results in the following conditions which must be 
O in  ^
satisfied at p., x , and X in order to insure a constrained i 3. S 
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maximum: 
3L 
9Pi 
9x^  N ax* N K 3y, 3xf 3V 
Pi-Pi " " :% " 
= Pi ^  " n=l  ^' nil kfl 3x: 'Pi 
S 
E X 
s=l 
K 3h. a^sk 3= 
s k=l afst 9x1 3p. 
< 0 (3.48) 
i = 1, 2, ... / N 
3L 
9Pi 
Pj_ = 0 (3.49) 
Pi=Pi 
i = 1, 2, N 
Pi 1 > 0 (3.50) 
i = If 2, .... N 
« 
N 3x* 
Z p 
n=l * 3x™ 
N 
Z 
K 
Z 3V 
n=l k=l 3y. 
3yj, Sx: 
=: 
n 
k K 
K 
Z 3V 
3y, S K 
^ y y y 
3h^  a^ sk 
. Zi A Z, 
3x^  s=l k=l afsk 
< 0 (3.51) 
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3L 
9x' m « 
x* = 0 (3.52) 
III — 1/ 2/ ••• /  M  
X™ > 0 
3. — 
(3.53) 
n i  —  X /  2 /  . « . /  M  
3L 
3X. = Ys - bsffsl' *32' •••' *8%) (3.54) 
9L 
9A. 
s^"^ s 
> 0 
s — 
s — 1/ 2/ .../ S 
X = 0 
s 
s — 1f 2 y .«.f S 
s  —  X /  2 /  . .  
(3.55) 
(3.56) 
Expressions 3.48 to 3.56 represent the conditions that 
must be satisfied in order for a multiproduct firm to maximize 
profit. However, these conditions haven't addressed themselves 
to another problem that arises, and by solving that problem 
perhaps the results from 3.48 to 3.56 can be improved upon. 
Before this problem is dealt with, an economic interpretation 
of the profit maximization conditions will be discussed. 
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Consider first the nonnegativity restriction on prices: 
Pi 1 0 (3.57) 
i = 1, 2 ,  ..., N 
This stipulates that the prices which the firm charges 
must be positive or zero. A question of interpretation arises 
with respect to the meaning of a zero price. If some output 
has a zero price, that particular item will be considered a 
nonprice offer variation. If price is zero, the only remaining 
decision with respect to the output is the level of utilization. 
Because of this, a zero price will be taken as a signal to 
handle the item as an x^ . 
This results in a restriction that prices charged by the 
firm have to be positive. It is well to recall that the p^ 's 
are associated with sold outputs. Prior to the profit maximiza­
tion problem at hand, the firm must make a decision as to what 
it is going to sell, i.e., exactly what is contained in the set 
of Xg's. It seems reasonable to assume that a firm will only 
choose items to include in its product line which can be sold 
at positive prices (This borders on a tautological argument. 
Selling probably implies a positive price. Otherwise, the firm 
is giving something away.). 
Expression 3.48 represents the condition that must hold 
if a multiproduct firm has set the price cf the i^  ^sold output 
at the profit maximizing level. It should be noted that the 
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inequality can be done away with and that the strict equality 
must hold. This is true because expression 3.49 requires that 
either 9L 
3Pi 
or p^  is equal to zero. Since is strictly 
Pi=Pi 
positive, it must follow that 3L 
9Pi 
IS zero. 
Pi=Pi 
A rearrangement of 3.48 makes it more amenable to economic 
interpretation. Taking the good as representative, putting 
3.48 into the profit margin framework of the Scitovsky-Holdren 
model results in;^  
% 
K 
Z 3V 
9yi 
N k=l 3y^  3Xg 
9x N 
N  ^ n=l 
Pn -
K 
Z 3V 
9y. 
k=i axQj 
n 
^Pn 
s 
z 
K 
z 
3h N 
S=1 kil afgk SXg 
(3.58) 
3x N 
3p. represents the change in the amount of the N 
th 
N 
product sold as a result of changing its price. Division of 
3.58 by this term leaves the expression by itself on the left 
side and puts the right side on a per unit basis. This 
operation results in 
S^ee pp. 11-18. 
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k a ' 
P. - : 
^ 9V 
n k=i aft Sx" S/:g 
S K Shg S^ sk 
+ Z Z (3.59) 
3=1 k.l 3?;% 3x« 
3.59 can be interpreted term by term from an economics 
^ 9V 
standpoint. On the left side of the equality, Z — 
!c=i sy,, axg 
represents the total change in variable costs directly 
attributable to selling an additional unit of the product, 
p^  represents the price being charged per unit sold of the 
product. The difference between these two is the profit margin 
on the good, i.e., the amount each unit sold contributes 
to firm profitability. 
The right side of 3.59 represents several costs that are 
incurred by the firm as a result of changing p^ . The first 
two terras combined represent the multiproduct price offer 
variation cost. It represents what might be called external 
costs incurred by the firm as a result of changing p^ . These 
are external because they reflect how a change in p^  affects 
the levels of all other sold outputs and their profit margins. 
The next term is an additional cost that arises because 
of a change in p^ . It represents what might be called an 
internal cost because it relates directly to the utilization 
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of resources within the firm. Z —  ^tells how the 
k=i aygk 
Utilization of fixed factor s changes because of different 
employment rates of variable inputs, where the variable input 
changes are necessitated because x^  changed. It is some number 
representing physical units. is the Lagrangian multiplier 
and can be interpreted as the imputed dollar value of a unit 
of fixed factor s.^  
K 9h 3y 
Xs Z 
sk 
N k=i 
is then the dollar value of any change 
N in the utilization of fixed factor s caused by changing x^ . 
Summing over all s fixed factors gives the change in the value 
N 
of these factors that results from changing x^ . 
In words, 3.59 states 
Profit Margin = 
Multiproduct 
price offer 
variation cost 
Imputed value of the 
change in utilization 
of fixed factors 
For the profit maximizing adjustment of p^ , the profit margin 
on the good should contribute just enough to offset the 
Kantorovich calls these multipliers "objectively deter­
mined valuations" which is a very meaningful title. They are 
objectively determined in the sense that the values which they 
take on depend on the initial endowments and constraints and 
result from the mathematics. They are valuations in the sense 
that they "permit a numerical valuation of the scarcity of the 
conditions of production, the scarcity of resources, restric­
tions of equipment, and the strain of the programme" (25, 
p. viii). 
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total increase in cost of selling an additional unit. 
Additional insight can be gained into the profit maxi­
mizing adjustment of price by a different arrangement of 3.59 
The terms could be collected in the following manner: 
9x' N 
•N 3 p. 
N 
9V 
N 
N-1 
—M a— ~ E 
k=l 3y, 9x n=l K Q 
Pn -
K 
Z 9V 
k=l 9y, 9x 
-^ k ( 
n 
n 
N 
S 
+ z 
K 3h 
s=l k=l 9y , 3x^  
sk I N 
(3.60) 
Consider the term on the left side of 3.60 
N 
-N 3Ph 
p>, + X N = X 1 + 
< 3% 
(3.61) 
In order to give meaning to the right hand side of 3.61, 
suppose a single product monopolist exists. Since we are 
considering quantity sold to be a function of price, let the 
monopolist's demand curve be written as 
q = f(p) 
Total revenue is then equal to 
T.R. = p • ( 
(3.62) 
(3.63) 
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Marginal revenue with respect to price, or how much 
revenue changes in response to a price change, is equal to 
1 + P dq q dp (3.64) 
It can be seen that the last expression in 3.64 is equal 
to the last expression in 3.61, and that both equal marginal 
revenue. In light of this, the condition for profit maximiza­
tion can be interpreted as requiring equality between marginal 
revenue, but in this case the marginal revenue of a price 
change, and a comprehensive marginal cost figure. Profit 
maximization requires that what a price change adds to revenue 
just equals what that price change adds to costs, where costs 
here include variable costs, price offer variation costs, and 
the costs of different utilization rates of the fixed factors. 
3.51 expresses the condition for the profit maximizing 
adjustment of a nonprice offer variation. Consider optimal 
adjustment of x^  with respect to the good. Casting the 
expression into a profit margin framework, one obtains 
Ptj ~ 
K 
Z 3V 
" k:! 
9x' N 
< 
m — 
K 
E 9V 
3x^  k=l 3y^  9x m 
a 
N-1 
Z 
n=l Pn -
K 
Z 9V 
3yi 
I 
9x^  Ic 
n 9x^  qj a 
+ 
s 
z 
K 
Z 
9h 9y sk 
s=i s k:i ax* 
(3.65) 
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Upon putting this on a per unit basis with respect to the 
N th good, the following expression results: 
K 
E 3V 
k:i Bpk axgj 
1 
N-1 
2 Pn -
g 3V ^^ k 3X-1 
—a 
k=l n=l k=l ax* ax"' 
a 
z z 
s=l  ^k=l 3y^ , 3x™ 
SK a 
3x N 
9x m 
(3.66) 
3.66 states the relationship that should exist between the 
amount that a unit of the good contributes to profit and 
the effect of this unit on costs after optimal adjustment of 
the m^  ^nonprice offer variation. 
The left side of 3.66 is the profit margin on the good. 
The first term on the right is the multiproduct nonprice offer 
variation cost from the Scitovsky-Holdren model. The second 
term on the right is also a cost of production—the cost of 
K ahg apsk 
using fixed factors. Z — represents the total 
Sfsk 
change in the utilization of fixed factor s because more 
variable inputs were hired in response to changing x™. is 
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the objectively determined valuation of an additional unit of 
fixed factor s. The dollar value of the change in the level of 
eirçloyment of fixed factor s resulting from changing x^  can 
K ah aPsk 
therefore be represented by Y. — —— , and the sum over 
all s is the total valuation of any change in fixed factor 
utilization caused by changing x . Division by —2. once again 
puts this on a per unit basis. 
In total, 3.66 says that in order to utilize x^  in the 
profit maximizing manner, the firm should employ it to where 
that aspect of the firm's offer causes the profit margin on the 
good to just exactly cover costs incurred by producing and 
selling the last item of the good. In other words, what 
x^  adds to net revenue (profit) for any good is just offset by 
the additional cost of using x™. The strict equality must hold 
in 3.66 in order to use x^ . 
If the inequality were to hold, what x^  adds to cost 
exceeds its profit contribution with respect to the good. 
This fact, in conjunction with 3.52, requires that x^  not be 
used and 3.53 permits a zero value for any x™. 
The remaining conditions, 3.54, 3.55, and 3.56 all relate 
to the utilization of the fixed factors. Rearrangement of 
3.54 results in 
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5^2' (3.54a) 
s = X, If •••/ S 
which is simply the earlier condition that utilization of any-
fixed factor cannot exceed its availability. If the strict 
O 
inequality holds in 3.54a, then = 0 because of 3.55. Since 
Xg is the value of an additional unit of fixed factor s, = 0 
in such a case because there is already a- surplus amount of 
factor s and additional units are unneeded and add nothing to 
the value of the firm. Finally, the imputed value of an 
additional unit of any fixed factor is restricted to be non-
negative. 
Expressions 3.59 and 3.66. are analogous to the equations 
of the Holdren model, 2.13 and 2.14. The additional term 
relating to the fixed factors is missing from the earlier 
equations because it was assumed in that model that no fixed 
factors were being used to capacity. This case is handled in 
3.59 and 3.66 because if no fixed factors are being completely 
used, all would equal zero, and then the equations would 
almost be identical. 
They aren't identical because of the problem that was 
alluded to earlier. Conditions 3.48 to 3.56 give rise to 
conditions for the profit maximizing levels of prices and non-
price offer variations. Corresponding to these will be levels 
of outputs from all types of processes: final sold products. 
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intermediate products, and nonsold outputs. Associated with 
these levels of outputs are costs. In Equations 2.13 and 2.14 
the C-function of total cost was assumed to represent the least 
cost method of production of each level of output. We have not 
shown that the value which V(y^ , y2' •••' takes on in 3.59 
or 3.64 represents the least cost method of production for the 
output levels of all processes which result from selecting the 
appropriate values of p^  and x^ . To get this minimum cost, we 
can go back and make use of the side relations, 3.25, which are 
the statements of the technical relationships of the processes. 
. O 
The output of each process has been fixed at some level, x , 
which corresponds to optimal adjustment of all prices and non-
price offer variations. The firm now tries to minimize cost 
subject to the requirement that the outputs of processes are at 
these levels. Formally the problem is to minimize 
VCYT ' y?' f y^) (3.67) 
subject to 
21 .31 ..Rl, 1° 
SltTl' ^ 2' •••' Yk' ' ^y ' " "  ^y y 
12 32 R2. 2° cot 
92(^ 1' ^ 2' K^' *y ' *y ' ' ' *y  ^* (3.68) 
- 1,R+N+M R,R+N+M, R+N+M 
Sr+N+M'^ I' ^ 2' •••' ^ K'" 
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This problem can be handled in the classical constrained 
optimization framework. The Lagrangian function would be 
B+N+M .0  ^
L(y%., Ug) = V(y^ , ^ 2' 7%) + Uj [x-J - gj(y^ ; ] 
(3.69) 
First order conditions for the least cost combination of inputs 
requires that 
0 (3.70, 
3yk 
k = 1, 2 , . . . , K 
Rearrangement of 3.70 results in 
R+N+M 3a. 
— = 2 u. —1 (3.71) 
ay^  j=i sîk 
k = 1, 2, . . . , K 
3V 
represents the change in cost that occurs because an 
994 
additional unit of y, is purchased. is the marginal 
product of the process with respect to the k^  input. Uj 
is the Lagrangian multiplier and can be interpreted as the 
dollar value of an additional unit of output of the process. 
66 
R+N+M 3g. 
The sum Z u. —^  is thus the total value of additional 
j=l  ^37% 
output from all processes which results from employing more 
For the least cost combination of inputs, 3.71 says that an 
input should be hired to where what it adds to cost just equals 
what it adds to the value of output. 
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CHAPTER IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE MULTIPRODUCT 
MODEL AND COMMENTS ON INTERPRETATION 
The first part of this chapter discusses several ways of 
using this model in gaining insight into a firm's short run 
decisions. The distinguishing characteristic of this short 
run is its immediacy. In this short run the concern of the 
firm is what it must do in order to sell something. It must 
make decisions affecting its offer. This discussion is by no 
means exhaustive. The model is very general and by appropri­
ately defining the variables one can make it applicable to a 
wide array of situations. The chapter ends by reiterating 
exactly what the objective of the model is. 
Applications of the Model 
Any change that a firm makes in its offer may affect both 
revenues and costs. The effects on revenues will include such 
things as the changes in the levels of sales of products, 
widths of profit margins, and the levels of nonprice offer 
variations. The effects on costs relate to such things as 
utilization rates of fixed factors, output rates of processes, 
and the choice of processes actually used. These costs arise 
from changes in the eitç)loyment levels of the variable factors 
and their allocation within the firm. 
Consider first the effects on sales levels and profit 
margins of some change in the firm's offer. Assume the firm 
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sells N products and that each product has its own downward 
sloping sales function: 
2^' ' PN' 
N N, ,. 
= ^ g(Pl' P2' •••' Pn' 
(4.1) 
where 
< 0 (4.2) 
oPj_ 
i — 1/ 2/ .../ N 
and A represents the vector of nonprice offer variations. 
To simplify the discussion of costs, consider a surrogate 
total cost function 
T.C. = C(Xg, x^ , ..., Xg,- A) (4.3) 
which expresses costs simply as a function of the levels of 
final outputs. 
Profit is the difference between total revenue and total 
cost and can be represented as 
TÎ = I p^  x* - C(x^ , ..., x^ ; A) (4.4) 
n=l H 4 si 4 
Concentrating on the profit maximizing adjustment of 
prices, first order conditions require that 
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% = Pn + < + : 
ax'* N 
i=l 
ÎT^ n 
i 3P; 
N 
Z 9C 
3x" 
i=l 3x i 3p 
= 0 (4.5) 
n 
for all prices. Note that this is forced to equal zero because 
of the previous stipulation that prices must be positive. 
Using good N as representative, putting 4.5 into the 
profit margin format results in 
Pn 
3C 
9x 
9x^  N-1 
N = -=g/ 95^  - n!l 
N 
3x" gj 
3x" /3x^  
9Pn/ 9P (4.6) N 
3x n 
By looking at 4.6 one can see that the signs of are 
-
going to have a substantial influence on the profit margin of 
the good. Other goods sold by the firm can be ignored 
only if good N is independent of all other sold outputs. If 
this were true, then 
n 
3p (4.7) N 
n = 1, 2, ..., N-1 
and the firm could adjust p^  oblivious of the effect good N 
has on the sales levels of the other goods. 
n 3x_ 
However, if the  ^terms are nonzero, these other 
products must be considered. If the relationship of good N 
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with the other goods is one that is dorciinantly substitution, 
then the -5—2- which are positive will on balance influence the 
% 
second term on the right side of 4.6. This fact makes the 
right side larger (It is assumed that the weighted profit 
margin term is positive for each good.), implying that the 
firm should adjust p^  towards a relatively high profit margin. 
From an intuitive standpoint as to what the firm should 
do, this makes sense. If a firm sells products which are 
substitutes, the fact that a customer buys one of those 
products precludes his buying another. Thus if the firm is 
going to make a sale, it should try to make that one sale as 
profitable as possible. 
Alternatively, if good N is dominantly complementary with 
all other goods that this firm sells, then those . ° which 
are negative will be the governing influence in the second term. 
This makes the second term on the right side of 4.6 positive, 
and when this is subtracted from the positive first term, it 
reduces the profit margin on good N. 
Once again, from an intuitive standpoint this makes sense. 
If all of the sold outputs are dominantly complements, they are 
related in sales and/or use. If the firm can sell good N to a 
particular customer, perhaps the customer will also buy items 
to use with good N. It might benefit the firm to aim for a 
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smaller profit margin on good N because this small margin will 
be more than compensated for by selling additional items. 
The above interpretation has some interesting implications 
if the goods represent sales at different points in time 
instead of different products. Suppose the firm submits bids 
for various contracts. If it is thought that several contracts 
might be forthcoming over time, the fizrm could consider such 
contracts complementary goods, because if it performs well on 
one contract it might have an advantage getting later orders. 
In light of the results of the model, the firm might have an 
incentive to aim for a relatively small profit margin on the 
first contract in anticipation of additional profits later. 
From a buyer's standpoint, this also gives rise to a 
strategy for making purchases. Even if the buyer knows that 
he will only need to purchase some item once, it may be wise 
to announce that this is only the first of potentially many 
purchases. If suppliers believe this, their smaller profit 
margins could leave the buyer much better off. 
The explicitness of the model can also be useful in 
showing more rigorously some of the results from conventional 
analysis of the firm. Suppose the firm is a monopolist selling 
only one product, but that it sells this product in two dif­
ferent markets. The problem facing the firm is how to divide 
its output between the two markets in such a manner as to 
maximize profit. 
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Let the output that is sold in the two markets be denoted 
1 2 
as X and x . The firm then faces a sales function in each g g 
market: 
=^9 = 4(Pl' P2' 
''q " P2'' A) 
(4.8) 
Cost will be given as the surrogate cost function: 
T.C. = C(Xg, Xg, A) (4.9) 
Profit is the difference between total revenue and total cost 
and is given by 
n = p^ Xg + PgXq - C(Xg, x^ ; A) (4.10) 
First order conditions for profit maximization require that 
= Pi 9^  + + P2 91^  - 9p, - ;;2 ap, -
q • q 
% = P2 15^  ^ + Pi - 7^  âpf -
q q 
Putting these into the marginal revenue-marginal cost 
framework of 3.60, one obtains: 
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1 
Pi 3^ 5 + Xq 
3C 3x-^  f 
9x1 3Pl 
g 
Po -
9C 
9x' qj 
3x' 
2 Bp, 
X = 3C 
9x 2 ^ *  
I 
Pi -
9C 
ax' 9j 
s? 
% 
(4.12) 
The left sides of these expressions are the marginal 
revenues with respect to price of good one and good two, 
3C ac 
respectively. —^  -r—^  and —=•  ^are the marginal cost of 
3x^  'Pi 3x^  ^ P2 
g g 
additional units of these goods. Since the goods are identical 
in production and only distinguishable because they are sold in 
different markets, these marginal cost of production expressions 
will be equal: 
3C 
3? ^Pl 
g 
1£ 
3x 
Sx' 
2 3p. = M.C. (4.13) 
We can now show how crucial is an assumption made in this 
analysis in order to get the standard result that the firm 
should allocate output so that the marginal revenues in each 
market are equal to each other, and that these are equal to 
marginal cost. In order to practice this type of price 
discrimination, it is necessary to isolate the markets. This 
means that the seller must keep the customers separate so that 
arbitrage cannot take place. If he is capable of doing this. 
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3x^  3x^  
then 
3P2 - 3Pi - 0 (4.14) 
and the last term on the right sides of the expressions in 4.12 
disappear. A simple collection of terms then gets the familiar 
result: 
= M.R.g = M.C. (4.15) 
On the production side, the interdependencies that are of 
interest can be explicitly dealt with. The partial derivatives 
3h 3h 
and are to be viewed in a comprehensive nature. The 
ax* q a 
rate of utilization of fixed factor s will of course change 
because x^  changes, but the change in x^  could also affect the 
output levels of all processes. These changes will also affect 
the utilization of factor s. The same chain of events must be 
kept in mind when some x^  is changed. This change could again 
conceivably affect the output rates of all other processes, and 
these changes will again affect the utilization of fixed factor s. 
The model also recognizes the problem of process choice 
and establishes criteria. For simplicity suppose the firm 
consists of only one process, but that two different technol­
ogies, a and b, exist for accomplishing this process. Also 
assume that the firm buys its inputs in perfectly competitive 
markets. 
75 
If the firm uses technology a, a condition for least cost 
combination of inputs corresponding to 3.70 would be 
99a 
V = u (4.16) 
k = 1, 2, ..., K 
where is the price of input k. 
If the firm uses technology b, the analogous relationship 
would be 
k = 1, 2, ...,K 
Putting 4.16 and 4.17 together, the following relation 
must hold if the firm is using two (or more) different pro­
cedures to carry out a given process: 
59= S^ b 
This states that what an input adds to the value of output 
in one technology should equal what that input adds to the value 
of output if it is used in another technology. If the equality 
did not hold, units of the input should be transferred from the 
technology with the smaller value to the technology with the 
larger value. 
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This valuation of processes has some usefulness when one 
starts talking about acquisition criteria when a firm is con­
sidering growth or expansion. Any given firm is a collection 
of processes and any firm that is a take-over target is also a 
collection of processes. By being able to assign value to the 
outputs of the various processes, the firm is capable of 
evaluating different combinations of processes, where the 
processes come from either firm or are new processes which 
result from the combining of the two firms' assets. 
This simplified firm with a small number of products and 
processes can also be used to show more lucidly the interpreta­
tion of the Lagrangian multipliers, and u^ .^ Suppose that 
1 2 the firm sells two products, and x^ , and that the firm is 
composed of three processes. Profit maximizing adjustment of 
p^  results in 
X K f 
k=l 3y^  3x 
is zero. 
(4.19) 
and 4.19 reduces to 
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The left side of 4.20 is the profit margin on good one. 
The first term on the right is the price offer variation cost. 
The second term is the imputed value of the fixed factors. If 
no fixed factors are being used to capacity, then all are 
zero and this term vanishes. However, as soon as some fixed 
factor is used to capacity, additional units of this factor 
would have value. This means that the \ associated with this 
factor, which we stated represents the value of additional 
units of the factor, becomes positive. When this happens, the 
profit margin must cover not only price offer variation cost 
but also must pay for the use of the fixed factor. This is 
true because if a fixed factor is being used to capacity, the 
use of some of it for good one may limit the amount that is 
available for use in good two. Thus an opportunity cost of 
using the factor arises which must be recovered. The positive 
value of the X reflects this cost. 
The small number of processes also permits interpretation 
of the u^ 's. Recall that least cost production requires that 
 ^= "T u. <4.21, 
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Suppose that input k is used only in good one, and that 
good one requires only process one. 4.21 becomes 
(4.22, 
Since only one process is used, this situation is 
analogous to models of the firm that postulate the firm 
possesses a production function. 4.22 exactly parallels the 
result from these models that the least cost production of a 
given level of output requires that an input be used to where 
the amount it adds to cost is equal to the value of its 
marginal product. Isolating u^ , one obtains 
9v_ y^^i 
= u, (4.23) 
This ratio is the dollar value per unit of output of process 
one. This corresponds entirely with our earlier interpretation 
of the u^ *s. 
Comments on Interpretation 
The model was constructed so that the goal of the firm was 
to maximize profit at some arbitrary point in time. As such 
it represents part of the overall problem facing the firm: the 
maximizing of profit over time, /°° ir dt. In order to maximize 
0 
/
CO 
IT dt, it is necessary to maximize profit at every time t. 
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The model developed in Chapter III does exactly that for an 
arbitrary t. Since we can solve the model for any t, we can do 
it for every t. Thus the results of the problem in Chapter III 
represent a necessary point on the path of profit that maxi­
mizes /°° TT dt. 
O 
This maximization of profit over time represents a control 
problem. In the generalized control problem, attention is 
centered on some real or hypothetical system. In the case at 
hand, that system is the firm. The problem is that of opti­
mizing the behavior of the system through time by choosing the 
time paths of certain variables called control variables. This 
represents a powerful approach. It forces us to realize that 
we can't have a simple one period maximization. One period 
can't be looked at in isolation because what has transpired in 
previous periods affects the current period and the current 
period affects future periods. Related to this is the fact 
that it forces upon us more clearly the distinction between 
those entities which we treat as variables and those entities 
which we treat as parameters at any given decision point. 
At time t, the driving force is the maximization of profit 
over sold output. The variables are those things which affect 
the firm's offer: prices and nonprice offer variations. In 
response to these variables, we will get output levels of sold 
products and intermediate products. This represents the 
minimum set of decisions the firm must make in order to 
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maximize profit. The levels of prices and some nonprice offer 
variations represent the unavoidable, initial decisions made 
at time t. 
Parameters at time t are those other entities over which 
the firm has either no control or whose values are not arrived 
at via the profit maximization at time t route. As an example 
of the former, the firm has no control over the stock of fixed 
factors it inherits from previous periods. For an example of 
the latter, the levels of the x^ 's are not determined by the 
profit maximizing conditions in Chapter III. Included in this 
would be investment and research and development activities 
whose costs and benefits may not be measurable at time t, and 
also some nonprice offer variation type activities whose levels 
are not alterable at time t (i.e., a long term television 
contract). These x^ 's are variables in the overall problem 
but at time t they are parameters, fixed at levels which the 
firm takes as given. These levels are important to profit 
maximization at time t because they affect the amounts of 
resources available to the firm over which to maximize. 
Getting back to relating our current problem to the con­
trol problem, we can describe the manner in which the firm 
changes through time by specifying the time behavior of a 
finite number of variables y^ (t), ..., y^  (t) . These are called 
state variables. For the firm they might include capital stock, 
assets, work force, technical expertise, reputation, etc. 
81 
There also exists a set of control variables v^ , V2/ ...^  v^ . 
These are such that if the time paths of the control variables 
are specified, then the time variation of the state variables 
is determined. Control variables for the firm in the short 
run are prices and some nonprice offer variations. A control 
is a vector valued function of time whose components are the 
control variables. 
To complete the problem, one needs a definition of the 
effectiveness of control. Such a measure is provided by 
'1  ^  ^ ft-,  ^ jk J[y, v] = F(t, y(t), v(t)) dt (4.24) 
to 
where above a letter denotes a vector. 
The control problem is then that of choosing a control 
v(t) from the set of allowable values for each t such that when 
y(t) is determined and an initial value is given, the functional 
4.24 is maximized or minimized. A control which satisfies these 
conditions is called an optimal control. 
For the firm under consideration, 4.24 would be the profit 
function, where profit at any time depends on the values of the 
state variables and the control variables. It is the choosing 
of the values of the control variables that is addressed in 
Chapter III. At a point in time the firm chooses the levels of 
prices and nonprice offer variations to maximize profit. By 
doing this for every time t, the expression in 4.24 is 
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maximized.^  
We are still left with a few gaps in the model. In 
particular, the choice of the set of the x^ 's and the set of 
the x^ 's has never been mentioned. Also, some of the x^ 's 
represent investment projects or other discrete activities, the 
selection of which requires special handling. Prior to the 
maximization of profit, the firm has to solve an integer 
programming problem, the solution of which is a discrete number 
of activities in which the firm should engage. The problem in 
Chapter III solves for levels of utilization of processes, but 
not for the exact array of processes. Integer programming is 
needed because these activities come in indivisible units. A 
partial product, a fraction of a nonprice offer variation, or 
2 part of an investment project would be meaningless entities. 
A final qualification of the model results from the fact 
that we simply do not know enough about how business firms 
behave in order to be sure that we are asking the right 
questions. The profit maximization assumption may be more 
T^his discussion of optimal control comes from (19, pp. 
238-242). It is couched in continuous terms as was the 
pioneering work by Pontryagin et al. (31). In solving such 
problems the necessary conditions are referred to as the maximum 
principle. In the case of a business fiirm, accounting pro­
cedures and other practicalities require a discrete analogue 
and one has been derived (16). For a brief but good discussion 
of optimal control applied to economics, see (11). 
2 For a discussion of situations where it is necessary to 
use integer programming, see (6). 
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heroic than it seems. It is questionable whether the firm is 
knowledgeable enough to maximize profit because it operates in 
an atmosphere of so many unknowns. It may not know all of the 
decision variables available to it, and even if it does it may 
not know the effect of manipulating, these decision variables. 
These issues represent not so much limitations of the 
model as questions still to be answered. As the model was 
developed, it represents a general approach to optimization by 
a multiproduct firm. Remaining problems arise not so much in 
the fact that the questions aren't answered as in the fact they 
aren't asked. 
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